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Abstract: 
Zimbabwe’s economic hara-kiri has become so stupendous that it can no longer be addressed 
without dealing with economic sanctions first. If nothing is done now, Zimbabwe will continue to 
sink deep down into the sanctions-induced economic doldrums. To set Zimbabwe on a genuine 
economic recovery path, economic sanctions must be removed first. Empirical evidence indicates 
that economic sanctions are not only predatory but also cancerous for any economy and they 
must be removed. This study shows that economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are 
detrimental to the economy; hence the urgent need for their removal. On the other side of the 
same coin, this paper also argues that the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are also 
backfiring against the imposers. Therefore, there is absolutely no need for their continued 
imposition since the sender-countries are also being hurt by the same sanctions! However, the 
need to “call a spade a spade” in handling the “issues” being raised by the sanctions-imposing 
countries is not unimportant given the gravity of the “sanctions game” in Zimbabwe. As 
Zimbabweans continue to lobby for the immediate removal of economic sanctions, this paper 
offers four-fold policy recommendations in order to boost Zimbabwe’s resistance to economic 
sanctions. 
I. Introduction 
For thousands of years, economic sanctions have been a tool of economic statecraft (Chan & 
Drury, 2000). Sanctions continue to be viewed as an important tool in promoting and 
maintaining international peace and security (Bessler et al, 2004). The main objective of 
sanctions is to ensure government compliance with the imposer’s interests and are usually seen 
as more humane than military intervention (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 2007; O’Driscoll, 2017). A 
traditional argument in favor of the use of sanctions over military conflict has been that even if 
they have a lower probability of success than military conflict, the relatively low cost to both 
sender and target might still make them a viable policy option (Allen & Lektzian, 2012).  
Sanctions are not like military conflict which is intended to kill civilians of the target country. 
They are a more humane but coercive policy (Drezner, 1998). Theoretically, sanctions are 
motivated by an implicitly humane rationale; although their implementation often wrecks great 
havoc and civilian suffering (Weiss et al, 1997). Most of the time it is claimed that sanctions and 
especially “targeted sanctions” aim at political leadership of sanctioned countries but, on the 
ground, sanctions can potentially hurt large numbers of people (Cheraghali, 2013). Sanctions are 
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an immoral foreign policy tool that indiscriminately and unjustly target poor and innocent 
elements of society (Damrosch, 1993; Al-Samarrai, 1995; Mueller & Mueller, 1999; Gordon, 
2002). 
Economic sanctions are one of the basic tools of international governance of the Post Cold War 
era that are always blamed for human suffering. Economic sanctions are questionable ethically 
because they impose disproportionate harm on innocent civilians (David, 1995). Although 
sanctions are intended to punish states to pressure them to change policies, it leads to predictable 
outcomes such as economic inefficiency, inequitable distribution of goods, civil conflicts and 
population movements (Garfield et al, 1995). 
Economic sanctions cause a significant disruption in the distribution of food, pharmaceutical and 
sanitation supplies, it jeopardizes the quality of food and the availability of clean drinking water, 
it severely interferes with the functioning of basic health and education systems and undermines 
the right to work (Holmes, 2008). Sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU) against 
Zimbabwe are a clear example that sanctions most of the time fail to reach their originally 
specified targets (Cheraghali, 2013). As a contingency measure against EU sanctions, Zimbabwe 
shifted its focus from the EU and its Western allies and formed economic partnerships with the 
Eastern countries (Mbanje & Mahuku, 2011). The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) has maintained that the economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are hurting the entire 
southern African region and hence the economic bloc will embark on a campaign to speak with 
one voice until the sanctions are lifted. The Heads of State and Government have declared the 
25th of October 2019 as the day of solidarity to lift the illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe 
(Lopi, 2019). It is imperative to note that the 25th of October each year will be set aside as a 
public holiday and solidarity day against illegal sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe and all SADC 
countries have agreed to conduct various activities in their respective countries on that day to 
resoundingly call for the immediate removal of the sanctions.  
Brief History of Economic Sanctions 
Economic sanctions are not a new thing the international world. Since the ancient Greek, 
sanctions have existed. They were first employed when Athens embargoed Megara in 432 BC, 
and triggered a war between the two countries which lasted for decades (Haufbauer et al, 1990). 
Economic sanctions were also used by Napoleon in the Continental System commencing in 1806, 
by Thomas Jefferson in the Embargo Act of 1807, and by the League of Nations against Italy in 
1935. Following the collapse of the Soviet Empire in 1990, there has been an acceleration of 
sanctioning activity that reflects their growing use by international organizations as well as by 
the one remaining world hegemon, the United States (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 2007). 
Economic Sanctions in Zimbabwe: An Overview 
Zimbabwe’s economy is battling for life due to sanctions imposed by the United States of 
America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), Australia, Canada and the European Union (EU). The 
Land Reform Programme implemented in Zimbabwe in 2001 is believed to be the one that 
triggered the imposition of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe in the form of the socalled 
Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). The violence accompanying the 
land reform exercise, as noted by Makaye & Munhande (2008); the deaths on the farms, and the 
allegations of human rights abuses on the part of the government were enough bases for the 
West’s imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. Chigora & Dewa (2009) noted that the ruling 
party and its allies that comprise of war veterans, youth militia and service chiefs were accused 
of fomenting intimidation, arson, kidnapping and murder. 
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According to Hurungo (2010), the USA and EU then imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in order to 
force politicians to refine government policies in a way that would ensure Zimbabwe is ruled in a 
democratic manner. The USA actually argues that the ZIDERA Act was endorsed to provide for 
a transition to democracy, to promote economic recovery and re-establish rule of law in 
Zimbabwe. ZIDERA is opposed to giving bilateral and debt relief and assistance to Zimbabwe 
until the government restores the rule of law, provides a platform for democratic elections, 
implements an equitable, legal and transparent land reform program, and establishes firm civilian 
control of the military, police and other state security forces amongst other things. The EU, in 
2001, joined the USA, and slapped Zimbabwe with the socalled “targeted measures” on pro-
ruling party entities, including high-ranking politicians, business figures, journalists and military 
personnel. According to Kurebwa (2019), when targeted sanctions are directed against political 
leaders and government officials of a particular country, it is usually the vulnerable groups of 
society who suffer and not the targeted group. It is imperative to highlight the fact that the 
sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are basically aimed at influencing political decisions in 
Zimbabwe although the senders claim to be seeking to restore democracy and promote economic 
recovery. The sanctions game in Zimbabwe is simply a game of politics!   
Objectives of the Study 
i. To analyze the sanctions – economic growth nexus in general. 
ii. To systematically review the impact of economic sanctions on the economy of Zimbabwe. 
iii. To investigate the harm caused by economic sanctions on the sender countries, with 
special reference the to the “sanctions game” in Zimbabwe. 
Research Questions 
i. What is the nature of the sanctions – economic growth nexus, in broad terms? 
ii. How do sanctions affect the economy of Zimbabwe? 
iii. Do economic sanctions hurt the sender countries too? 
II. Literature Review 
What Are Economic Sanctions? 
Table 1: Definitions 
Definition Source 
Economic sanctions are coercive economic measures taken against one 
or more countries to force a change in policies or at least to 
demonstrate a country’s opinion about the other’s policies 
Rennack & Shuey (1999) 
Economic sanctions can be defined as the deliberate, government-
inspired withdrawal, or threats of withdrawal, of customary trade or 
financial relations 
Boozer (2000) 
Economic sanctions refer to the actual or threatened withdrawal of 
normal trade or financial relations, imposed by the sender against the 
target, for foreign policy purposes 
Nyun (2008) 
Economic sanctions are restrictions upon international trade and 
financial dealings one country or a group of countries impose on 
another, usually as punishment for following policies of the 
sanctioning country/countries disapproves 
Kern (2009) 
Economic sanctions can be defined as actions that one or countries 
take to limit or end their economic relations with a target country in an 
effort to persuade that country to change its policies or behavior 
Morgan et al (2009); Prinslow (2010) 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term “economic sanctions”. Table 1 above is a 
summary of the most common definitions in literature. It is important to note that the definitions 
given by Rennack & Shuey (1999), Boozer (2000), Nyun (2008) and Kern (2009) are quite 
applicable in the case of Zimbabwe. However, the definition given by Morgan et al (2009) and 
Prinslow (2010) does not match the Zimbabwean scenario because the economic sanctions 
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imposed on Zimbabwe cannot be described as seeking to “persuade” Zimbabwe to changer her 
policies or behavior. It is almost unnecessary to highlight the fact that economic sanctions 
imposed on Zimbabwe are coercive and they clearly portray foreign policy positions. Hence the 
definitions of economic sanctions given by Rennack & Shuey (1999) and Kern (2009) best 
describe the Zimbabwean scenario.  
How Do Economic Sanctions Work (or not Work)? 
Economic sanctions work by inflicting damage on the target country, its ruling elite and core 
support groups, the sanctions will prompt the leadership to choose to change its objectionable 
policy in response to a straightforward cost-benefit calculus (Kirshner, 1997). The mechanism 
through which economic sanctions are believed to achieve their ultimate objectives from an 
economics perspective is based on a reversal of the international trade theories, which assume 
that world economic welfare is maximized under conditions of free trade (Smeets, 2018). In all 
cases, economic sanctions are supposed to work by imposing some kind of pain on the target 
country, and particularly on its ruling regime, which then alters its policies in order to comply 
with the sender’s demands and thereby avoid further sanctions damage (Kaempfer & Lowenberg, 
2007). One of the core assumptions of traditional sanctions theory is that the pain inflicted by 
sanctions on citizens of target states will cause them to pressure their government into making 
the changes demanded by the sanctioning body (Mack & Khan, 2000). Given the increased 
interdependence and the close network of economic, trade and investment relations among 
Western countries, economic sanctions are increasingly less likely to work (Smeets, 2018). 
According to Elliot et al (2008), there are basically four main methods of applying sanctions on 
the target country and these are: 
i. Freezing financial assets. 
ii. Suspension of technical and aid assistance. 
iii. Trade controls. 
iv. Blacklisting  the target country. 
Freezing Financial Assets 
This includes the following: 
 Freezing the off-shore assets of individual members of the target nation’s ruling elite. 
 Confiscation of different forms of assets. 
 Stopping transfer payment and interest. 
 Not paying the debt or rescheduling debt payment and interest. 
 Refusal to do joint projects with a target country or company or individual in a target 
country. 
Suspension of Technical and Aid Assistance 
This includes the following: 
 Cancellation or reduction of credit facilities at market rate. 
 Cancellation or suspension of assistance in military, development and training. 
 Inability (because of lower number of votes) to get grants, subsidies and loans in 
international organizations. 
Trade Controls 
These are also called the “goods and services” sanctions and include the following: 
 Import or export quota. 
 Limiting exports (embargoes) of the target country. 
 Limiting imports of the target country (boycott). 
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 Tariff policy against the target country. 
 Cancellation or restriction of fishing rights. 
 Cancellation or suspension of trade agreements. 
 Ban on export of technology. 
Blacklisting the Target Country 
This includes the following: 
 Blacklisting target companies so that they are unable to do business with other countries. 
 Blacklisting of the countries that are doing business with the targeted country.  
How Targeted Regimes Respond To Sanctions 
Regimes targeted by sanctions rarely try to counteract the impact of sanctions, but rather pursue 
policies and strategies that magnify the sanctions’ negative effect on the economy with the aim 
of preventing the population from revolving. The government deliberately deteriorates economic 
activity in order to increase the economic hardship of the population so that any revolt proves 
costly for citizens. Even though the sanctions affect the elite, owing to their strong economic 
starting position, funds hidden around the world and international collaborators, it is the local 
population who feel the effect the most. The targeted regime will look for ways out of the 
sanctions, which will either be to find a suitable exile opportunity or to carry on with its strategy 
until the sanctions end (Oechslin, 2014). 
Economically sanctioned countries like Zimbabwe often suffer from the “devil-may-care” 
syndrome where-by they tend to formulate and implement bad economic policies and 
consequently keep on putting the blame on economic sanctions. Surely, you can’t argue that 
every socio-economic ill in Zimbabwe was caused by economic sanctions. That kind of thinking 
doesn’t help us as a country. Thus, the government of Zimbabwe must stick to good public 
policy as a matter of urgency. For example: you can’t argue that corruption is rampant in 
Zimbabwe because of economic sanctions; as a policy maker, you fail to keep inflation under 
control and claim it’s because of economic sanctions; as a country, you face a natural disaster 
such as drought, and still think it’s because of economic sanctions! The “sanctions must go” 
campaign is usually abused in countries such as Zimbabwe. Many governments whose 
economies are being affected by economic sanctions usually behave irresponsibly and then try to 
hide behind the economic sanctions menace. Yes, economic sanctions must go but bad economic 
policies cannot be an excuse.   
The Sanctions – Economic Growth Nexus: Evidence From Other Countries 
Table 2: The Sanctions – Economic Growth Nexus: Evidence From Other Countries 
Author/Year Country Main Findings 
Rarick (2006) Myanmar  The U.S sanctions had a negative impact on the economy 
of Myanmar. 
 The only thing that sanctions succeeded in was destroying 
the country. 
Wood (2008) 157 countries  Sanctions lead to an increase in state-sponsored repression 
thus leading to negative economic growth rates. 
 Military and arms sanctions are better than economic 
sanctions because they cause the population no harm. 
Drury & Peksen 
(2010) 
102 countries  Sanctions cause economic hardships.  However, economic hardship caused by sanctions can be 
used as a strategic tool by the regime to consolidate power 
and weaken the opposition. 
Drury & Peksen 
(2014) 
146 countries  Economic sanctions have a negative impact on women’s 
access to economic and social status. 
 Economic sanctions lead to women experiencing a higher 
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level of economic burden. 
Choi & Luo (2013) 152 countries  Economic sanctions intensify the suffering of the poor to a 
far greater extent than the rich. 
 Thus, the imposition of economic sanctions triggers 
terrorist violence. 
Neuenkirch & 
Neumeier (2015) 
160 countries  Economic sanctions have a significant negative impact on Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Aluoch (2015) Sudan  Economic sanctions contracted the economy of Sudan at a 
rate of -11.2% per annum. 
Roshan et al (2015) Iran  Economic sanctions negatively affect health and hence 
harm sustainable development.  
Francis & Duncan 
(2016) 
Cuba and Soviet 
Union 
 Sanctions unintentionally strengthened the links between 
Cuba and the Soviet Union. Trade increased between the 
two countries. Both countries benefited economically. 
 Sanctions led to double digit growth rates in the tourism 
industry in Cuba, which stimulated the Cuban economy. 
Kokabisaghi (2018) Iran  Sanctions on Iran caused the following: fall of Iran’s 
revenues, devaluation of national currency, high inflation 
and unemployment. 
The Sanctions – Economic Growth Nexus: Evidence From Zimbabwe 
Table 3: The Sanctions – Economic Growth Nexus: Evidence From Zimbabwe 
Author/Year Country Main Findings 
Nzaro et al (2011) Zimbabwe  Sanctions have a negative effect on Zimbabwe’s financial 
services. 
Mbanje & Mahuku 
(2011) 
Zimbabwe  Sanctions hurt the economy. 
Masaka (2012) Zimbabwe  Targeted sanctions on Zimbabwe brought with it bad 
publicity, record low credit rating and a pariah state; thus 
leading to economic collapse. 
Hove (2012) Zimbabwe  Sanctions negatively affect the economy of Zimbabwe. 
Hove & Chingono 
(2013) 
Zimbabwe, Cuba, 
Rhodesia, Burma, Iran 
 Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe are dehumanizing on the 
ordinary Zimbabwean because service delivery in water and 
sanitation, education, health and food production has 
collapsed. 
 Sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe have not yet led to the 
intended quick political resolution. 
 Sanctions have succeeded in triggering volatile political 
disharmony. 
Chipanga & Mude 
(2015) 
Zimbabwe  Sanctions hurt innocent civilians by destroying the 
economy. 
 On the other hand, sanctions may be effective; for example, 
in Zimbabwe the formation of the GNU and the inherent 
drafting of the constitution were triggered by pressure from 
sanctions. The Mugabe regime had vowed not to negotiate 
with opposition parties, because of the pressure of 
sanctions, the regime succumbed to it, making it clear that 
sanctions were effective. 
Mararike (2019) Zimbabwe  Sanctions negatively affect the economy of Zimbabwe. 
III. Methodology 
The research adopted a systematic review approach in order to gather up all the necessary 
information on the sanctions – economic growth relationship. Judgemental sampling was 
employed to choose the representatives of the sample. The standard criterion for selection was 
the relevance of topic and the geographical area of studies. 
IV. Results & Discussion 
Description of Reviewed Studies 
Table 4: Description of Reviewed Literature 
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Author/Year Country Period Under Study Method 
Rarick (2006) Myanmar 1974 – 2005  Descriptive and analytical approach. 
Wood (2008) 157 countries 1976 – 2001 Probit models, interconnected linear 
regressions.  
Drury & Peksen 
(2010) 
102 countries 1972 – 2000  Simultaneous models. 
Nzaro et al (2011) Zimbabwe 2010 – 2011  Descriptive Survey Design 
Mbanje & Mahuku 
(2011) 
Zimbabwe 2002 – 2011  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Masaka (2012) Zimbabwe 2001 – 2011  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Drury & Peksen 
(2014) 
146 countries 1971 – 2005  Ordered logit regression models.  
Hove (2012) Zimbabwe 2001 – 2011  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Choi & Luo (2013) 152 countries 1968 – 2004  Binomial regression analysis.  
Aluoch (2015) Sudan 1989 – 2014  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Chipanga & Mude 
(2015) 
Zimbabwe 2001 – 2013  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Neuenkirch & 
Neumeier (2015) 
160 countries 1976 – 2012  Panel data analysis.   
Roshan et al (2015) Iran 1960 – 2014  Descriptive and analytical approach 
Francis & Duncan 
(2016) 
Cuba and Soviet 
Union 
1960 – 2015  Descriptive and analytical approach.   
Kokabisaghi (2018) Iran January 2012 – 
February 2017 
Systematic Review 
Mararike (2019) Zimbabwe 2001 – 2018  Descriptive and analytical approach 
The Impact of Sanctions on Economic Growth: A Summary 
Table 5: Summary of the Sanctions – Economic Growth Nexus 
Argument Source 
Sanctions are detrimental to economic growth Rarick (2006); Wood (2008); Drury & Peksen (2010); Nzaro et al (2011); Mbanje & Mahuku (2011); Masaka (2012); Hove (2012); 
Drury & Peksen (2012); Hove & Chingono (2013); Choi & Luo 
(2013); Aluoch (2015); Chipanga & Mude (2015); Neuenkirch & 
Neumeier (2015); Roshan et al (2015); Kokabisaghi (2018); Mararike 
(2019). 
Sanctions yield positive effects on the 
economy 
Chipanga & Mude (2015); Francis & Duncan (2016) 
As shown in table 5 above, there is overwhelming empirical evidence to prove that sanctions are 
not good for any economy. However, few papers such as Chipanga & Mude (2015) and Francis 
& Duncan (2016) still argue that sanctions may be effective and beneficial to the target country.  
Costs of Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Zimbabwe: Major Costs 
It is almost unnecessary to reiterate the fact that economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe 
seldom directly destroy the infrastructure of Zimbabwe: what is actually happening on the 
ground is that Zimbabwe’s infrastructure, especially roads, hospitals and sanitation systems are 
being neglected and thus fall into disrepair due to economic sanctions. This sanctions-induced 
neglect and scarcity has inflicted untold suffering on the ordinary, innocent and poor 
Zimbabweans. In Zimbabwe, economic sanctions have significantly reduced the quality and 
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quantity of clean water. In all urban areas, it is now normal to experience water shortages and 
sometimes drinking water available from city councils would be dirty with visible objects of 
faecal-nature. 
Furthermore, due to lack of unfettered access to nutritious food and clean water, the average 
level of health of Zimbabweans has significantly deteriorated. It is also imperative to highlight 
the fact that Zimbabwe’s health sector is genocidal right now due to economic sanctions which 
have reduced the capacity of the public health system. Simple and treatable diseases have 
become life-threatening problems in Zimbabwe because of a perennially inadequate supply of 
medicines and medical and pharmaceutical equipments. As a result, a health worker in 
Zimbabwe is always demoralized and demotivated by the poor working conditions. Moreso, 
economic sanctions have significantly reduced available resources for Zimbabwe’s health sector 
and as a result options for preventive care and curative medical services have become 
unacceptably limited.  
Costs of Economic Sanctions to the Sender: Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Backfiring? 
Economic sanctions have the potential to backfire and consequently leave the sender with a 
negative net result (Drezner, 2000). Since trade is a two-way relation, restricting trade in one 
direction will automatically result in lost revenues or alternatively increased costs in the opposite 
direction. Furthermore, besides limiting trade through obstruction of financial flows, economic 
sanctions also have a backward effect in terms of declining capital flows into the sender country 
(Besedes et al, 2017). 
Economic sanctions can provoke the leaders in the target country to use the sanctions as an 
explanation for the lower levels of growth and welfare, instead of failing economic policies, 
resulting in them digging in their heels and resisting the sanctions even more, thus making it 
even harder achieving the set objectives. For example, in the sanctions that were imposed against 
Iraq, Saddam Hussain was even more determined than ever before to resist the outside pressures, 
eventually leading to a military intervention (Smeets, 2018). 
Economic sanctions are a form of “investment” that senders definitely pay costs for acquiring 
profits in the future. This means that, while the target country is obviously going to lose in the 
“sanctions-game”, the sender country is also losing in one way or the other. While Zimbabwe is 
bound to be hurt by the sanctions, we cannot rule out the fact that the sender-countries are also 
going to “feel the heat”. Therefore, the sanctions game can be a lose-lose game! For example, 
trade sanctions change the behavior of economic agents, thus several long-run trade contracts 
would not be able to continue. This usually damages the economy of the sender because the 
process of finding new trade partners instead of target is usually cumbersome and takes a long 
period of time. In business, time is money. Lost time is tantamount to lost revenues! 
Consequently, many people lose their jobs in the sender country. The sender country also loses 
the market of target by imposing trade embargoes. Thus the USA and other countries which have 
imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe; are also being hurt by the sanctions in terms of lost 
gains from trade and investment. If these losses were to be quantified, it would not be surprising 
to find that these sender-countries have suffered a lot due to sanctions, especially when it comes 
to lost jobs and revenues in their economies.    
V. Recommendations 
While we are still lobbying for the immediate removal of economic sanctions imposed on 
Zimbabwe, this is what we can do for now in order to boost our resistance to economic sanctions: 
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i. Take diplomatic steps to create an alliance with friendly countries such as China, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Iran amongst others; in line with the Look East Policy.  
ii. Develop an import-substituting industry. 
iii. Divert Zimbabwe’s trade to new trading partners. 
iv. Zimbabwe should engage “sanctions busters” in order to create and sustain loopholes in 
the sanctions and thus undermine their effectiveness.  
VI. Conclusion 
While economic sanctions may be attractive policy tools for governments wanting to express 
discontent with a country’s behavior, it is arguable if from an economics perspective sanctions 
can achieve the change that is often envisaged through the punitive measures taken (Smeets, 
2018). It is ironic and paradoxical to note that the USA, UK, Australia, Canada and EU, who are 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), continue to impose economic sanctions on 
Zimbabwe and yet WTO’s main aim is to liberalize trade. One of the direct purposes of 
economic sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe is to restrict trade which they purport to liberalize 
through the WTO! Therefore, it is clear that these countries are desperately trying to deprive 
Zimbabwe from economic gains that Zimbabwe can obtain through trade. Last but not least, it is 
not unimportant to highlight the fact that economic sanctions are not the only problem that is 
frustrating Zimbabweans. Nyoni & Bonga (2017) actually noted that the economy of Zimbabwe 
is riddled with poverty, inequality, informality, chronic and recurrent phases of economic 
stagnation, poor institutional climate, cash crisis, rampant corruption, political volatility, low 
savings and investment, high interest rates, high costs of production, lack of competitiveness, 
low aggregate demand, poor infrastructure as well as high rates of unemployment. All these 
problems, together with economic sanctions have put Zimbabweans in a difficult situation.   
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